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Abstract— Recently, quantum error-correcting codes were pro-
posed that capitalize on the fact that many physical error models
lead to a significant asymmetry between the probabilities for
bit flip and phase flip errors. An example for a channel which
exhibits such asymmetry is the combined amplitude damping and
dephasing channel, where the probabilities of bit flips and phase
flips can be related to relaxation and dephasing time, respectively.
We give systematic constructions of asymmetric quantum stabi-
lizer codes that exploit this asymmetry. Our approach is based
on a CSS construction that combines BCH and finite geometry
LDPC codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many quantum mechanical systems the mechanisms for
the occurrence of bit flip and phase flip errors are quite
different. In a recent paper Ioffe and Me´zard [10] postulated
that quantum error-correction should take into account this
asymmetry. The main argument given in [10] is that most of
the known quantum computing devices have relaxation times
(T1) that are around 1 − 2 orders of magnitude larger than
the corresponding dephasing times (T2). In general, relaxation
leads to both bit flip and phase flip errors, whereas dephasing
only leads to phase flip errors. This large asymmetry between
T1 and T2 suggests that bit flip errors occur less frequently
than phase flip errors and a well designed quantum code
would exploit this asymmetry of errors to provide better
performance. In fact, this observation and its consequences for
quantum error correction, especially quantum fault tolerance,
have prompted investigations from various other researchers
[1], [8], [20].
Our goal will be as in [10] to construct asymmetric quantum
codes for quantum memories and at present we do not consider
the issue of fault tolerance. We first quantitatively justify how
noise processes, characterized in terms of T1 and T2, lead
to an asymmetry in the bit flip and phase flip errors. As a
concrete illustration of this we consider the amplitude damping
and dephasing channel. For this channel we can compute the
probabilities of bit flip and phase flips in closed form. In
particular, by giving explicit expressions for the ratio of these
probabilities in terms of the ratio T1/T2, we show how the
channel asymmetry arises.
After providing the necessary background, we give two
systematic constructions of asymmetric quantum codes based
on BCH and LDPC codes, as an alternative to the randomized
construction of [10].
II. BACKGROUND
Recall that a quantum channel that maps a state ρ to
(1− px − py − pz)ρ+ pxXρX+ pyYρY + pzZρZ, (1)
with 1 =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, X =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, Y =
[
0 −i
i 0
]
, Z =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
is called
a Pauli channel. For a Pauli channel, one can respectively
determine the probabilities px, py, pz that an input qubit in
state ρ is subjected to a Pauli X, Y, or Z error.
A combined amplitude damping and dephasing channel E
with relaxation time T1 and dephasing time T2 that acts on a
qubit with density matrix ρ = (ρij)i,j∈{0,1} for a time t yields
the density matrix
E(ρ) =
[
1− ρ11e
−t/T1 ρ01e
−t/T2
ρ10e
−t/T2 ρ11e
−t/T1
]
.
This channel is interesting as it models common decoherence
processes fairly well. We would like to determine the proba-
bility px, py, and pz such that an X, Y, or Z error occurs
in a combined amplitude damping and dephasing channel.
However, it turns out that this question is not well-posed, since
E is not a Pauli channel, that is, it cannot be written in the
form (1). However, we can obtain a Pauli channel ET by a
technique called twirling [7], [5]. In our case, the twirling
consists of conjugating the channel E by Pauli matrices and
averaging over the results. The resulting channel ET is called
the Pauli-twirl of E and is explicitly given by
ET (ρ) = 1
4
∑
A∈{1,X,Y,Z}
A†E(AρA†)A.
Theorem 1: Given a combined amplitude damping and
dephasing channel E as above, the associated Pauli-twirled
channel is of the form
ET (ρ) = (1− px − py − pz)ρ+ pxXρX+ pyYρY + pzZρZ,
where px = py = (1 − e−t/T1)/4 and pz = 1/2 − px −
1
2
e−t/T2 . In particular,
pz
px
= 1+ 2
1− et/T1(1−T1/T2)
et/T1 − 1
.
If t≪ T1, then we can approximate this ratio as 2T1/T2 − 1.
Proof: The Kraus operator decomposition [18] of E is
E(ρ) =
2∑
k=0
AkρA
†
k, (2)
where A0 =
[
1 0
0
√
1−λ−γ
]
;A1 =
[
0 0
0
√
λ
]
;A2 =
[
0
√
γ
0 0
]
,
and
√
1− γ− λ = e−t/T2 , 1 − γ = e−t/T1 . We can rewrite
the Kraus operators Ai as
A0 =
1+
√
1− λ− γ
2
1 + 1−
√
1− λ− γ
2
Z,
A1 =
√
λ
2
1 −
√
λ
2
Z, A2 =
√
γ
2
X−
√
γ
2i
Y.
Rewriting E(ρ) in terms of Pauli matrices yields
E(ρ) = 2− γ+ 2
√
1− λ − γ
4
ρ+
γ
4
XρX+
γ
4
YρY
+
2− γ− 2
√
1− λ − γ
4
ZρZ
−
γ
4
1ρZ− γ
4
Zρ1 + γ
4i
XρY −
γ
4i
YρX. (3)
It follows that the Pauli-twirl channel ET is of the claimed
form, see [5, Lemma 2]. Computing the ratio pz/px we get
pz
px
=
2− γ− 2
√
1− λ − γ
γ
=
1+ e−t/T1 − 2e−t/T2
1− e−t/T1
,
= 1+ 2
e−t/T1 − e−t/T2
1− e−t/T1
= 1+ 2
1 − et/T1−t/T2
et/T1 − 1
= 1+ 2
1− et/T1(1−T1/T2)
et/T1 − 1
.
If t≪ T1, then we can approximate the ratio as 2T1/T2 − 1,
as claimed.
Thus, an asymmetry in the T1 and T2 times does translate
to an asymmetry in the occurrence of bit flip and phase flip
errors. Note that px = py indicating that the Y errors are as
unlikely as the X errors. We shall refer to the ratio pz/px as
the channel asymmetry and denote this parameter by A.
Asymmetric quantum codes use the fact that the phase flip
errors are much more likely than the bit flip errors or the
combined bit-phase flip errors. Therefore the code has different
error correcting capability for handling different type of errors.
We require the code to correct many phase flip errors but it is
not required to handle the same number of bit flip errors. If we
assume a CSS code [4], then we can meaningfully speak of X-
distance and Z-distance. A CSS stabilizer code that can detect
all X errors up to weight dx− 1 is said to have an X-distance
of dx. Similarly if it can detect all Z errors upto weight dz−1,
then it is said to have a Z-distance of dz. We shall denote such
a code by [[n, k, dx/dz]]q to indicate it is an asymmetric code,
see also [19] who was the first to use a notation that allowed to
distinguish between X- and Z-distances. We could also view
this code as an [[n, k,min{dx, dz}]]q stabilizer code. Further
extension of these metrics to an additive non-CSS code is an
interesting problem, but we will not go into the details here.
Recall that in the CSS construction a pair of codes are
used, one for correcting the bit flip errors and the other for
correcting the phase flip errors. Our choice of these codes
will be such that the code for correcting the phase flip errors
has a larger distance than the code for correcting the bit flip
errors. We restate the CSS construction in a form convenient
for asymmetric stabilizer codes.
Lemma 2 (CSS Construction [4]): Let Cx, Cz be linear
codes over Fnq with the parameters [n, kx]q, and [n, kz]q
respectively. Let C⊥x ⊆ Cz. Then there exists an [[n, kx +
kz − n, dx/dz]]q asymmetric quantum code, where dx =
wt(Cx \ C⊥z ) and dz = wt(Cz \ C⊥x ).
If in the above construction dx = wt(Cx) and dz = wt(Cz),
then we say that the code is pure.
In the theorem above and elsewhere in this paper Fq denotes
a finite field with q elements. We also denote a q-ary narrow-
sense primitive BCH code of length n = qm − 1 and design
distance δ as BCH(δ).
III. ASYMMETRIC QUANTUM CODES FROM LDPC CODES
In [10], Ioffe and Me´zard used a combination of BCH
and LDPC codes to construct asymmetric codes. The intu-
ition being that the stronger LDPC code should be used for
correcting the phase flip errors and the BCH code can be
used for the infrequent bit flips. This essentially reduces to
finding a good LDPC code such that the dual of the LDPC
code is contained in the BCH code. They solve this problem
by randomly choosing codewords in the BCH code which are
of low weight (so that they can be used for the parity check
matrix of the LDPC code). However, this method leaves open
how good the resulting LDPC code is. For instance, the degree
profiles of the resulting code are not regular and there is little
control over the final degree profiles of the code. Furthermore,
it is not apparent what ensemble or degree profiles one will
use to analyze the code.
We propose an alternate scheme that uses LDPC codes
to construct asymmetric stabilizer codes. We propose two
families of quantum codes based on LDPC codes. In the
first case we use LDPC codes for both the X and Z channel
while in the second construction we will use a combination of
BCH and LDPC codes. But first, we will need the following
facts about generalized Reed-Muller codes and finite geometry
LDPC codes.
A. Finite Geometry LDPC Codes ([14], [21])
Let us denote by EG(m,ps) the Euclidean finite geometry
over Fps consisting of pms points. For our purposes it suffices
to use the fact that this geometry is equivalent to the vector
space Fmps . A µ-dimensional subspace of Fmps or its coset is
called a µ-flat. Assume that 0 ≤ µ1 < µ2 ≤ m. Then we
denote by NEG(µ2, µ1, s, p) the number of µ1-flats in a µ2-
flat and by AEG(m,µ2, µ1, s, p), the number of µ2-flats that
contain a given µ1-flat. These are given by (see [21])
NEG(µ2, µ1, s, p) = q
(µ2−µ1)
µ1∏
i=1
qµ2−i+1 − 1
qµ1−i+1 − 1
, (4)
AEG(m,µ2, µ1, s, p) =
µ2∏
i=µ1+1
qm−i+1 − 1
qµ2−i+1 − 1
, (5)
where q = ps. Index all the µ1-flats from i = 1 to n =
NEG(m,µ1, s, p) as Fi. Let F be a µ2-flat in EG(m,ps). Then
we can associate an incidence vector to F with respect to the
µ1 flats as follows.
iF =
{
ij |
ij = 1 if Fj is contained in F
ij = 0 otherwise.
}
.
Index the µ2-flats from j = 1 to J = NEG(m,µ2, s, p).
Construct the J× n matrix H(1)EG (m,µ2, µ1, s, p) whose rows
are the incidence vectors of all the µ2-flats with respect to the
µ1-flats. This matrix is also referred to as the incidence matrix.
Then the type-I Euclidean geometry code from µ2-flats and
µ1-flats is defined to be the null space, i. e., Euclidean dual
code) of the Fp-linear span of H(1)EG (m,µ2, µ1, s, p). This is
denoted as C(1)EG (m,µ2, µ1, s, p). Let H
(2)
EG (m,µ2, µ1, s, p) =
H
(1)
EG (m,µ2, µ1, s, p)
t. Then the type-II Euclidean geometry
code C(2)EG (m,µ2, µ1, s, p) is defined to be the null space of
H
(2)
EG (m,µ2, µ1, s, p). Let us now consider the µ2-flats and
µ1-flats that do not contain the origin of EG(m,ps). Now
form the incidence matrix of the µ2-flats with respect to
the µ1-flats not containing the origin. The null space of this
incidence matrix gives us a quasi-cyclic code in general, which
we denote by C(1)EG,c(m,µ2, µ1, s, p), see [21].
B. Generalized Reed-Muller codes ([12])
Let α be a primitive element in Fqm . The cyclic generalized
Reed-Muller code of length qm − 1 and order ν is defined as
the cyclic code with the generator polynomial whose roots αj
satisfy 0 < j ≤m(q−1)−ν−1. The generalized Reed-Muller
code is the singly extended code of length qm. It is denoted
as GRMq(ν,m). The dual of a GRM code is also a GRM
code [2], [3], [12]. It is known that
GRMq(ν,m)⊥ = GRMq(ν⊥,m), (6)
where ν⊥ = m(q− 1) − 1− ν.
Let C be a linear code over Fnqs . Then we define C|Fq , the
subfield subcode of C over Fnq as the codewords of C which
are entirely in Fnq , (see [9, pages 116-120]). Formally this can
be expressed as
C|Fq = {c ∈ C | c ∈ Fnq}. (7)
Let C ⊆ Fn
ql
. The the trace code of C over Fq is defined as
trql/q(C) = {trql/q(c) | c ∈ C}. (8)
There are interesting relations between the trace code and the
subfield subcode. One of which is the following result which
we will need later.
Lemma 3: Let C ⊆ Fn
ql
. Then C|Fq , the subfield subcode
of C is contained in trql/q(C), the trace code of C. In other
words
C|Fq ⊆ trql/q(C).
Proof: Let c ∈ C|Fq ⊆ Fnq and α ∈ Fql . Then
trql/q(αc) = c trql/q(α) as c ∈ Fnq . Since trace is a surjective
form, there exists some α ∈ Fql , such that trql/q(α) = 1.
This implies that c ∈ trql/q(C). Since c is an arbitrary element
in C|Fq it follows that C|Fq ⊆ trql/q(C).
Let q = ps, then the Euclidean geometry code of order r
over EG(m,ps) is defined as the dual of the subfield subcode
of GRMq((q− 1)(m − r− 1),m), [3, page 448]. The type-I
LDPC code C(1)EG (m,µ, 0, s, p) code is an Euclidean geometry
code of order µ− 1 over EG(m,ps), see [21]. Hence its dual
is the subfield subcode of GRMq((q − 1)(m − µ),m) code.
In other words,
C
(1)
EG (m,µ, 0, s, p)
⊥ = GRMq((q− 1)(m − µ),m)|Fp . (9)
Further, Delsarte’s theorem [6] tells us that
C
(1)
EG (m,µ, 0, s, p) = GRMq((q − 1)(m − µ),m)|
⊥
Fp
,
= trq/p
(
GRMq((q− 1)(m − µ),m)⊥
)
= trq/p(GRMq(µ(q− 1) − 1,m)).
Hence, C(1)EG (m,µ, 0, s, p) code can also be related to
GRMq(µ(q − 1) − 1,m) as
C
(1)
EG (m,µ, 0, s, p) = trq/p(GRMq(µ(q − 1) − 1),m). (10)
C. New families of asymmetric quantum codes
With the previous preparation we are now ready to construct
asymmetric quantum codes from finite geometry LDPC codes.
Theorem 4 (Asymmetric EG LDPC Codes): Let p be a
prime, with q = ps and s ≥ 1,m ≥ 2. Let 1 < µz < m
and m− µz + 1 ≤ µx < m. Then there exists an
[[pms, kx + kz − p
ms, dx/dz]]p
asymmetric EG LDPC code, where
kx = dimC(1)EG (m,µx, 0, s, p); kz = dimC
(1)
EG (m,µz, 0, s, p).
For the distances dx ≥ AEG(m,µx, µx−1, s, p)+1 and dz ≥
AEG(m,µz, µz − 1, s, p) + 1 hold.
Proof: Let Cz = C(1)EG (m,µz, 0, s, p). Then from equa-
tion (10) we have
Cz = trq/p(GRMq(µz(q− 1) − 1,m).
By Lemma 3 we know that
Cz ⊇ GRMq(µz(q− 1) − 1,m)|Fp ,
Cz ⊇ GRMq((q− 1)(m − (m − µz + 1)),m)|Fp ,
where the last inclusion follows from the nesting property of
the generalized Reed-Muller codes. For any order µx such that
m − µz + 1 ≤ µx < m, let Cx = C(1)EG (m,µx, 0, s, p). Then
Cx is an LDPC code whose dual C⊥x = GRMq((q− 1)(m−
µx),m)|Fp is contained in Cz. Thus we can use Lemma 2 to
form an asymmetric code with the parameters
[[pms, kx + kz − p
ms, dx/dz]]p
The distance of Cz and Cx are at lower bounded as dx ≥
AEG(m,µx, µx − 1, s, p) + 1 and dz ≥ AEG(m,µz, µz −
1, s, p) + 1 (see [21]).
In the construction just proposed, we should choose Cz
to be a stronger code compared to Cx. We have given the
construction over a nonbinary alphabet even though the case
p = 2 might be of particular interest.
Our next construction makes use of the cyclic finite geom-
etry codes. Our goal will be to find a small BCH code whose
dual is contained in a cyclic Euclidean geometry LDPC code.
For solving this problem we need to know the cyclic structure
of C(1)EG,c(m,µ, 0, s, p). Let α be a primitive element in Fpms .
Then the roots of generator polynomial of C(1)EG,c(m,µ, 0, s, p)
are given by [11, Theorem 6], see also [13], [15]. Now,
Z = {αh | 0 < max
0≤l<s
Wps(hp
l) ≤ (ps − 1)(m − µ)},
where Wq(h) is the q-ary weight of h = h0 + h1q +
· · · + hkqk−1, i. e., Wq(h) =
∑
hi. The finite geometry
code C(1)EG,c(m,µ, 0, s, p) is actually an (µ− 1, ps) Euclidean
geometry code. The roots of the generator polynomial of the
dual code are given by
Z⊥ = {αh | min
0≤l<s
Wps(hp
l) < µ(ps − 1)}.
In fact, the dual code is the even-like subcode of a primitive
polynomial code of length pms−1 over Fp and order m−µ,
whose generator polynomial, by [13, Theorem 6], has the roots
Zp = {α
h | 0 < min
0≤l<s
Wps(hp
l) < µ(ps − 1)}.
Thus Z⊥ = Zp ∪ {0}. Now by [13, Theorem 11], Zp
and therefore Z⊥ contain the sequence of consecutive roots,
α,α2, . . . , αδ0−1, where δ0 = (R + 1)pQs − 1 and m(ps −
1) − (m− µ)(ps − 1) = Q(ps − 1) + R. Simplifying, we see
that R = 0 and Q = µ giving δ0 = pµs − 1. It follows that
C
(1)
EG,c(m,µ, 0, s, p)
⊥ = GRMq(m, (q− 1)(m − µ))|Fp
⊆ BCH(δ0).
Thus we have solved the problem of construction of the
asymmetric stabilizer codes in a dual fashion to that of [10].
Instead of finding an LDPC code whose parity check matrix
is contained in a given BCH code, we have found a BCH
code whose parity check matrix is contained in a given finite
geometry LDPC code. This gives us the following result.
Theorem 5 (Asymmetric BCH-LDPC stabilizer codes):
Let Cz = C
(1)
EG,c(m,µ, 0, s, p) and δ ≤ δ0 = pµs − 1. Let
n = pms − 1 and Cx = BCH(δ) ⊆ Fnp . Then there exists an
[[n, kx + kz − n, dx/dz]]p
asymmetric stabilizer code where dz ≥ AEG(m,µ, µ−1, s, p),
dx ≥ δ and kx = dimCx, kz = dimCz.
Perhaps an example will be helpful at this juncture.
Example 6: Let m = s = p = 2 and µ = 1. Then
C
(1)
EG,c(2, 1, 0, 2, 2) is a cyclic code whose generator polyno-
mial has roots given by
Z = {αh|0 < max
0≤l<2
W22(2
lh) ≤ (m − µ)(ps − 1) = 3}
= {α1, α2, α3, α4, α6, α8, α9, α12}.
As there are 4 consecutive roots and |Z| = 8, it defines a
[15, 7,≥ 5] code. The roots of the generator polynomial of
the dual code are given by
Z⊥ = {αh|0 < min
0≤l<2
W22(2
lh) ≤ µ(ps − 1) = (22 − 1)}
= {α0, α1, α2, α4, α5, α8, α10}.
We see that Z⊥ has two consecutive roots excluding 1,
therefore the dual code is contained in a narrowsense BCH
code with design distance 3. Note that pµs − 1 = 3. Thus we
can choose Cx = BCH(3) and Cz = C(1)EG,c(2, 1, 0, 2, 2) and
apply Lemma 2 to construct a [[15, 3, 3/5]]2 asymmetric code.
We can also state the above construction as in [10], that
is given a primitive BCH code of design distance δ, find
an LDPC code whose dual is contained in it. It must be
pointed out that in case of asymmetric codes derived from
LDPC codes, the asymmetry factor dx/dz is not as indicative
of the code performance as in the case of bounded distance
decoders. For m = p = 2, we can derive explicit relations for
the parameters of the codes.
Corollary 7: Let C = C(1)EG,c(2, 1, 0, s, 2) and δ = 2t+ 1 ≤
2s − 1. Then there exists an
[[22s − 1, 22s − 3s − s(δ− 1), δ/2s + 1]]2
asymmetric stabilizer code.
Proof: The parameters of C are [22s−1, 22s−3s, 2s+1]2,
see [15]. Since C⊥ is contained in a BCH code of length
22s − 1 whose design distance δ ≤ 2s − 1, we can compute
the dimension of the BCH code as 22s − 1 − s(δ − 1), see
[17, Corollary 8]. By Lemma 2 the quantum code has the
dimension 22s − 3s − s(δ− 1).
Example 8: For m = p = 2 and s = 4 we can obtain a
[255, 175, 17] LDPC code. We can choose any BCH code with
design distance δ ≤ 24 − 1 = 15 to construct an asymmetric
code. Table I lists possible codes.
TABLE I
ASYMMETRIC BCH-LDPC STABILIZER CODES
s δ Code Asymmetry Rate
[[n,k,dx/dz ]]2 dz/dx
4 15 [[255,119,15/17]]2 ≈ 1 0.467
4 13 [[255,127,13/17]]2 ≈ 1.25 0.498
4 11 [[255,135,11/17]]2 ≈ 1.5 0.529
4 9 [[255,143,9/17]]2 ≈ 2 0.561
4 7 [[255,151,7/17]]2 ≈ 2.5 0.592
4 5 [[255,159,5/17]]2 ≈ 3 0.624
4 3 [[255,167,3/17]]2 ≈ 6 0.655
IV. PERFORMANCE RESULTS
We now study the performance of the codes constructed in
the previous section. Due to space constraints the discussion
will be rather brief, but more details will be supplied in a
forthcoming paper. We assume that the overall probability
of error in the channel is given by p, while the individual
probabilities of X, Y, and Z errors are px = p/(A + 2),
py = p/(A+2) and pz = pA/(A+2) respectively. The exact
performance would require us to simulate a 4-ary channel and
also account for the fact that some errors can be estimated
modulo the stabilizer. However, we do not account for this
and in that sense these results provide an upper bound on the
actual error rates. The 4-ary channel can be modeled as two
binary symmetric channels – one modeling the bit flip channel
and the other the phase flip channel. For exact performance,
these two channels should be dependent, however, a good
approximation is to model the channel as two independent
BSCs with cross over probabilities px + py = 2p/(A + 2)
and py + pz = p(A + 1)/(A + 2). In this case the overall
error rate in the quantum channel is the sum of the error rates
in the two BSCs. While this approach is going to slightly
overestimate the error rates, nonetheless it is useful and has
been used before [16]. Since the X-channel uses a BCH code
and decoded using a bounded distance decoder, we can just
compute Pxe the X error rate, in closed form. The error rate in
the Z channel, Pze is obtained through simulations. The overall
error rate is
Pe = 1− (1− P
x
e)(1 − P
z
e) = P
x
e + P
z
e − P
x
eP
z
e ≈ Pxe + Pze.
The LDPC code was decoded using the hard decision bit
flipping algorithm given in [14]. The maximum number of
iterations for decoding is set to 50. In Figure 1 we see the
performance of [[255, 159, 5/17]] as the channel asymmetry is
varied from 1 to 100. We can clearly see the improvement as
the channel asymmetry increases.
10−210−1
10−4
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10−1
100
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Fig. 1. Performance of [[255,159,5/17]] code for A= 1,10,100
The question naturally raises how do these codes compare
with the codes proposed in [10]. Strictly speaking both con-
structions have regimes where they can perform better than
the other. But it appears that the algebraically constructed
asymmetric codes have the following benefits with respect to
the randomly constructed ones of [10].
• They give comparable performance and higher data rates
with shorter lengths.
• The benefits of classical algebraic LDPC codes are in-
herited, giving for instance lower error floors compared
to the random constructions.
• The code construction is systematic.
Our codes also offer flexibility in the rate and performance of
the code because we can choose many possible BCH codes for
a given finite geometry LDPC code or vice versa. The flip side
however is that the codes given here have higher complexity
of decoding.
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